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Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal
Incoherence in Hosanna-Tabor
by Frederick Mark Gedicks*
I. INTRODUCTION: THICK RELIGION?
The federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination are among
the most important statutes ever enacted.1 They constitute the most
significant federal commitment to eradication of the unjustified
discrimination in the economic sector that has persisted since Recon-
struction. The laws nevertheless did not address one significant issue:
whether and how anti-discrimination norms should apply to ministers
and other religious leaders employed by churches and other religious
congregations.
2
The laws are not wholly silent, to be sure. They allow religious groups
to discriminate in favor of members of their own religion when they hire
* Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School.
Brigham Young University (B.A., 1977); University of Southern California (J.D., 1980). I
am grateful to Professor Hal Lewis and Mercer Law Review Articles Editor Pamela
Christine Hartig for the invitation to publish this Article. A portion of this Article is based
on a presentation in October 2011 at a First Amendment Law Review symposium held at
the University of North Carolina School of Law when Hosanna-Tabor was pending. I
received helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts from my BYU colleagues at a
workshop in August 2012, and from Marie Fallinger, Roger Hendrix, Hal Lewis, Chip
Lupu, Bill Marshall, Bob Tuttle, and Jack Sammons. Zach Lewis and Jared Trent supplied
excellent research assistance.
1. The most salient of these is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1864, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2006), which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, national
origin, and sex (including pregnancy). See also Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 623 (2006); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006 & Supp.
2009).
2. In keeping with the stylistic convention in this area, I use "churches" to refer to all
religious groups rather than just Christian congregations, and "ministers" to refer to all
religious leaders rather than just Protestant leaders.
405
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leaders,3 thus avoiding (what we might hope are) hypothetical absurdi-
ties like a Baptist minister who sues because no synagogue will hire him
as its rabbi. The laws do not, however, generally exempt churches from
statutory sanctions against racial, national-origin, sex, or disability
discrimination when they deal in the employment of ministers and other
church leaders. By their terms, the federal anti-discrimination laws
would prohibit the Roman Catholic Church from discriminating on the
basis of sex in filling positions with ordained priests, or the African
Methodist Episcopal Church from discriminating on the basis of race in
hiring and firing its congregational ministers.
The federal courts of appeal handled this issue by reading a "ministe-
rial exception" into federal anti-discrimination laws. The exception
originated as a rather aggressive statutory interpretation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 Later decisions constitutionalized the
exception, rooting it in one or both of the Religion Clauses or in the First
Amendment generally.' Some version of the exception has now been
adopted by every judicial circuit.6
Commentators have long disputed the doctrinal basis of the ministeri-
al exception,7 and until last term the United States Supreme Court had
3. E.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) ("This subchapter shall not apply to ... a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its
activities."); id. § 2000e-2(eX2) ("ifit shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a
school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire
and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other
educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned,
supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious
corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university,
or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation
of a particular religion.").
4. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
5. E.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.
1985).
6. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
705 n.2 (2012) (citing cases).
7. The literature on the exception is vast. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in
the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979); Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free
Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1633 (2004); Caroline Mala
Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from
AntiDiscrimination Law, 75 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1965 (2007) [hereinafter Corbin, Above the
Law?]; Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1193-1204 (2004); Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure
and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43 (2008);
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never passed on its constitutional validity. In Hosanna-Tabor Church
& School v. EEOC,5 however, the Court held for the first time that the
Religion Clauses require the ministerial exception to federal anti-
discrimination laws.'
Hosanna-Tabor is filled with incongruous stories and doctrinal
inconsistencies. First, there are at least three plausible accounts of what
happened in Hosanna-Tabor, each of which is in tension with the others.
Second, the Court's endorsement of the ministerial exemption as a
necessary feature of church autonomy overlooks that churches subvert
autonomy as often as they protect it.'0 Third, the exception described
by the Court is a strange mixture of rights and structure that is likely
to be carved up with exceptions and limitations." And finally, the
Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEo. J.L. & PUB. POLY 253 (2009)
[hereinafter Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited]; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts,
Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (2009) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and
Congregations]; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical
Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REv. 1789, 1795 (2004) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical
Immunity]; Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1164-72 (2011). See generally
Symposium, Church Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1093 (2004).
For discussions of the exception in light of Hosanna-Tabor, see Thomas C. Berg et al.,
Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 175 (2011); Mark E. Chopko & Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold Question:
Refining the Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 233
(2012); Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v. EEOC, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 951 (2012) [hereinafter Corbin,
Hosanna-Tabor]; Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization's Autonomy in Matters of Self-
Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 168 (2012) [hereinafter
Esbeck,Autonomy]; Richard Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT
59 (2007) [hereinafter Garnett, Freedom of the Church], available at httpJ/ssrn.cor/abstrac-
t=916336; Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026046; Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, Nw.
U. L. REV. (forthcoming), http:l/ssrn.com/abstract=1934433; Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-
Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLy 839 (2012) [hereinafter
Laycock, Ministerial Exception]; Samuel J. Levine, Hosanna-Tabor and Supreme Court
Precedent: An Analysis of the Ministerial Exception in the Context of the Supreme Court's
Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 120 (2011);
Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2011);
Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the
Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289 (2012).
8. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (unanimous opinion by Roberts, C.J.).
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
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Court goes to this trouble to protect a conception and practice of
institutional religion that are quickly passing away.'2
II. STORIES
A. Religion/Law/Life
1. Believers. The Court's story of the case begins with the plaintiff
Cheryl Perich, a member of the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church (Missouri Synod) and a teacher at one of its "ministries," a K-8
Lutheran school.' Perich was originally hired as a "lay" teacher on a
one-year contract, but near the end of her first year, the Hosanna-Tabor
congregation appointed her as a "called" teacher. A called Lutheran
teacher has completed a course of theological study, passed an oral
faculty examination, been endorsed by his or her local synod, and called
by a congregation. Called teachers are formally commissioned "minis-
ters," and may be terminated only for cause upon a supermajority vote
of the calling congregation. 4
Once called, Perich taught at the school for several apparently
uneventful years. Towards the end of the 2003-2004 school year,
however, she began to suffer health problems that interfered with her
ability to teach.' Perich began the 2004-2005 school year on disability
leave and was eventually diagnosed with narcolepsy, a condition which
caused "sudden and deep sleeps from which she could not be roused."16
On January 27, 2005, after her condition had been treated and
stabilized with prescription medication, Perich notified the school that
she had been medically cleared to work and planned to begin teaching
again within a month. The school principal responded that the school
had already filled Perich's position with a lay teacher and thus had no
class for her to teach; she also expressed doubt that Perich was in fact
ready to return to teaching. Within a matter of days, the school board
endorsed this judgment and advised the congregation that Perich would
be incapable of returning to teach for at least the current and the
following school year. The congregation accordingly voted to offer Perich
a "peaceful release" from her position under which she would voluntarily
resign in exchange for partial payment of her health insurance
12. See infra Part V.
13. Opening Brief for Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2414707, at *3.
14. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699-700.
15. Id. at 700.
16. Id.
408 [Vol. 64
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premiums for the remainder of the calendar year. Perich declined to
resign and instead provided written certification from her doctor
attesting that she was capable of working. The school reiterated that it
had no position for her to return to and again urged her to resign.
17
Nevertheless, Perich appeared at the school to resume teaching on
February 22, refusing the school's request to leave until she received a
written certification that she had reported for work. Later that same
day, the principal advised Perich that her earlier "insubordination"
would probably result in her termination.'" Perich replied that she had
consulted an attorney and "intended to assert her legal rights" under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).'9 That evening, the school's
governing board initiated the process of rescinding Perich's call, and
subsequently gave her notice of its recommendation that she be
terminated from her position as a called teacher. The board's stated
reasons for termination were Perich's behavior on February 22 and her
later threat of legal action, the latter of which violated Lutheran
doctrine mandating that ministers resolve their differences within the
church and not in a secular court. The congregation rescinded Perich's
call and formally terminated her as a teacher on April 11, 2005, less
than three months after Perich had advised the school of her diagnosis
and intention to return to work.20 In short, the Court tells the appar-
ently straight-forward story of a Lutheran congregation defending the
integrity of its beliefs by terminating a Lutheran minister who had
violated Lutheran doctrine.
2. Discriminators. The timeline alone contradicts the Court's story
that Perich was fired because she violated Lutheran doctrine prohibiting
ministers from resolving their differences in secular litigation rather
than internally through the church: Even in the Court's version of
events, Perich did not threaten legal action until after the principal had
informed her that the school was going to fire her.2' A fuller consider-
ation of the record reveals the story of a principal, school board, and
congregational leader actively working to keep a narcoleptic off their
faculty-the very sort of discrimination prohibited by the ADA and,
ironically, by the school itself.
2
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 700-01.
20. Id. at 700.
21. Id.
22. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Luteran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769,782
(6th Cir. 2010) (stating that the Lutheran Church (Missouri Synod) "personnel manual,
which includes EEOC policy, and the Governing Manual for Lutheran Schools clearly
40920131
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This story begins with Perich's taking disability leave at the beginning
of the 2004-2005 school year on the express understanding that her
position would be held for her while she recovered.23 Perich's doctors
had a difficult time pinpointing the source of her illness, but on
December 16, 2004, Perich advised the school that she had been
definitively diagnosed with narcolepsy, and that medication would allow
her to return to work within two to four months.2 4
On January 10, less than a month later and despite her knowledge
that Perich was planning to return in the near future, the school
principal filled Perich's position for the remainder of the school year.2 5
The school also viewed this new teacher as a likely permanent "called"
replacement for Perich.26 On January 19, the principal inquired of
Perich whether she would be subject to restrictions when she returned;
in reply Perich communicated her doctor's prognosis that she would be
"fully functional with the assistance of medication."21 Two days later,
the principal advised Perich of the school's intention to amend its
disability policy to require that called teachers resign when their
disability leaves reach six months; by this time, Perich had been on
disability leave "for over five months."28
contemplate that teachers are protected by employment discrimination and contract laws");
Brief for Respondent Cheryl Perich, Hosanna-Tabor 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553),
2011 WL 3380507, at *6, ("Even when [the ADA is] not technically applicable to a church,
as a Christian organization the church should not discriminate against persons with
disabilities and should, where reasonably possible without undue hardship, take the lead
in making reasonable accommodations for disabled workers.") (quoting the Synod personnel
manual).
23. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881,
884 (E.D. Mich. 2008), vacated, 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012);
see Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 773 (noting that school principal Stacey Hoeft promised
Perich a position at the school when she regained her health); Joint Appendix, Hosanna-
Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2940670, at *161 [hereinafter J. App.]("I don't want you to feel like I'm trying to push you out. You still have a job with us wejust want what's best for you and for our students.") (e-mail from principal to Perich).
24. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 884.
25. Id.
26. J. App., supra note 23, at *134. The principal later claimed that it was this new
hire, and nothing else, that prevented the school from allowing Perich to return to work.
Id. at 138 (Perich's termination had "nothing to do with the disability. It was wholly on the
policy of there was no position to return to for the remainder of that year.") (deposition
testimony); accord id. at 158 ("[Perich] was not going to be able to return to work, whether
her doctor said she was able to or not ... the fact was there was no position for her to
return to at that time.") (deposition testimony).
27. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 884.
28. Id.
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On January 27, Perich advised the principal that she would be
medically able to return to work in mid or late February.29 Three days
later, in direct contradiction to the opinion of Perich's doctor and without
consulting any reliable medical authority,'° the school board concluded
that Perich would be unable to work for the rest of the current school
year, as well as the year after that, and recommended that the
congregation terminate her call.3 ' In short order the congregation
voted to ask Perich for her voluntary resignation,32 and consulted an
employment law attorney about terminating her.3 Although the board
and congregational leaders lacked any information or expertise about the
effectiveness of prescription drug treatments for narcolepsy, they
repeatedly expressed their concern that Perich's return would threaten
the safety of children in her classroom.'
29. Id. This surprised the principal because only a few days earlier Perich's condition
had prevented her from completing some forms requested by the school. Id.
30. E.g., J. App., supra note 23, at *74 (congregational president admitting he had no
medical expertise) (deposition testimony); id. at *123 ("Q. [Clan you tell me what material
you looked at [regarding narcolepsy]?" A. "I just looked it up on the Internet.") (deposition
testimony of principal); id. at *132-33 (conceding that board had "no medical recommenda-
tion either way" when it decided that Perich was not capable of teaching for the next two
school years, but was unable to recall what the non-medical information and considerations
that informed that decision) (deposition testimony).
A board member claiming a "medical background" advised the board and the
congregational leadership that a narcoleptic needed to be asymptomatic for at least three
months before one could be certain that medication had controlled his or her condition, and
that parents of the schoolchildren would want to see six months to a year without symp-
toms. Id. at *84-85 (deposition testimony of Congregation president); id. at *114 [ 9
(Perich affidavit). This beard member turned out to be a nursing school dropout who had
no expertise in narcolepsy and no medical expertise or experience beyond introductory
nursing classes and certification as a medical assistant. Id. at *195-97 (deposition
testimony of board member).
31. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 884.
32. Id. at 884-85. Formally, the congregation asked Perich to request a "peaceful
release" from her position, which all parties agree was equivalent to asking for her
resignation. Id.
33. J. App., supra note 23, at *103 (deposition testimony of Synod's district superinten-
dent of schools).
34. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 884-85 (stating concern that "Perich's condition
would jeopardize the safety of the students" in her class) (deposition testimony of
principal); J. App., supra note 23, at *84 ("Q. Do you recall [the principal] saying that she
didn't understand how - how Ms. Perich could be responsible for a classroom of children
when she wasn't even allowed to drive? A. I remember hearing that comment.") (deposition
testimony of congregation president); id. at *136 ("There was no education on the disorder
at all, so there was - there was, I would say, a feeling of being uncomfortable because there
was - there was an unknown .... I mean, we were talking about her going into and being
responsible for a classroom full of children.") (deposition testimony of principal); id. ("Q.
[Wias the school board concerned about whether or not, you know, Cheryl would be able
412 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
Within a week, Perich's doctor cleared her "to return to work without
restrictions on February 22," which constructively terminated her
disability leave as of that date. 5 The board and congregation ignored
the doctor's clearance,36 and they repeated their request for her
resignation." On February 21, Perich emailed the principal that she
intended to report for work the next day, but when she showed up the
principal asked her to leave because there was no position left for her at
the school. 8 Perich refused to go until she received written confirma-
tion that she had reported for work, apparently to avoid a constructive
resignation under the school's employment policies and practices. 9 As
the Court indicated, ° that evening the principal told Perich she would
be fired for "insubordination";4 only then did Perich threaten to sue.42
to keep from passing out or remain conscious? A. rm sure there was some concern about
that.") (deposition testimony of principal); id. at *193-94 ("[Ilt was the concern about her,
you know, not being able to take care of the classroom in a normal setting way. Is she
going to be all right? Will she - is the medication going to affect her? Will it affect the
children in the classroom? Will she pass out or, you know, whatever .... What will
happen if you do fall out, medication wise? You know, what reactions is there going to be?
You know, will the children be safe?") (deposition testimony of board member).
35. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 885.
36. Id. ("Despite the doctor's note, the board remained concerned about Perich's ability
to supervise students for an entire school day."); J. App., supra note 23, at *197 ("Q. Did
the folks at the meeting, the members of the school board decide to disregard the doctor's
opinion? A. Yes.") (deposition testimony of board member).
37. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 885.
38. Id.
39. Id. ("[Tihe Hosanna-Tabor employee handbook states that failure to return to work
on the first day following the expiration of an approved medical leave is viewed as a
voluntary termination.").
40. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700.
41. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 885. Neither the Court's opinion nor the
opinions or record below make clear why Perich's presence and behavior on February 22
might have been a fireable offense: The record discloses only that Perich went first to the
teacher preparation room before classes started, and from there was directed to the
principal's office; she apparently left the school directly from the principal's office after
obtaining written acknowledgment that she had reported for work. There is no indication
that she had any contact with school children or that she interfered with the work of
teachers or administrators. Compare J. App., supra note 23, at *142 ("I found that to be
wholly insubordinate that she found that her form of communication to her superior to
return to work after nine months of not being in the building - that her way of notifying
me would have been at 9:00 at night through my work e-mail.") (deposition testimony of
principal), and id. at *229 (By e-mailing the principal the night before about returning to
work, after having been informed that the school no longer had a position, "it is clear that
your intent was not to return to work, but rather to create upheaval at our school ....
Your behavior demonstrates your total lack of concern for the ministry of Hosanna-Tabor
Lutheran School.") (e-mail to Perich by school. board chairman), with id. at *96 (denying
that Perich was terminated because of her behavior on February 22) (deposition testimony
HOSANNA-TABOR
In short, this story shows the ministerial exception deployed as a
pretextual smoke-screen to hide classic disability discrimination and
retaliation prohibited by the ADA. From the moment Perich advised
Hosanna-Tabor of her diagnosis, the principal, the school board, and
congregational leaders worked to force her out of her position because
they feared a narcoleptic in their classrooms. Perich's belated threat to
sue was an ironic gift to Hosanna-Tabor, without which the congregation
could not have credibly maintained that her termination was about her
doctrinal violation rather than her disability.
3. Administrators. This story begins with the pressures that
Perich's illness and leave placed on almost everyone associated with the
school. At the time of the events that gave rise to this case, the school
had only seven teachers;' it cannot have been easy to run such a small
school in Perich's absence without hiring a replacement teacher. The
principal tried to cover Perich's classes by assigning existing teachers
responsibility for Perich's students, thereby combining three grades in
a single classroom.4 What was intended as a temporary situation
became a drain on the teachers as it Wore on through the first semester
and into the second.4 It was also apparently less than ideal for
student learning.46 School administrators understandably received
Perich's December estimate of a two- to four-month return with some
skepticism, given her extended difficulty in obtaining diagnosis and
treatment and her previous postponement of other target return dates.
47
of congregation president).
Professor Failinger suggested to me that the school may have believed that Perich
violated social norms of respect and deference towards higher ministerial authority
prevalent in some Lutheran communities.
42. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700-01.
43. Opening Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at *3.
44. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774 n.1; Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 884;
Laycock, Ministerial Exception, supra note 7, at 843.
45. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 884 (Principal began pressing Perich for a
return date "[iun anticipation of the 2005-2006 school year"); J. App., supra note 23, at *66
(noting that the school was "combining classrooms and that was not working out very
well") (deposition testimony of congregation president).
46. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774 n.1 (noting "teacher and parent complaints
concerning the stress of teaching three grades with one teacher").
47. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 884 (noting that the principal was surprised
when Perich indicated her intention to return in mid to late February because "only days
before, Perich had disclosed that she was unable to fill out her disability forms because of
her condition"); J. App., supra note 23, at *126-27 ("She had given me estimates previously
[of when she would return] and [had] not ever lived up to that estimate... so it was, for
me and for our school, difficult to say that for sure this was going to be true . ...")
(deposition testimony of principal); id. at *131 (relating uncertainty caused by Perich's
41320131
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Even if accurate, the estimated return date would have required the
students to adjust to yet a third teacher in a single school year when
Perich returned, while also placing pressure on a budget not designed to
compensate both Perich and the substitute for the remainder of the
year.48 Yet, there is also evidence that the community sincerely cared
about Perich personally, regularly encouraging her in her effort to heal
and return to teaching, and shielding her from the problems her illness
was creating for the school and others.49
In the chronically underfunded environment of religious private
education ° and faced with understandable teacher complaints about
overwork, legitimate worries about student well-being, and the desire to
support a struggling colleague, school administrators muddled through,
inconsistently responding to these incompatible demands until, in their
view, the situation became impossible.51  As Professor Failinger
trenchantly observed, "even from the emails, one can sense the growing
desperation."52 At that point, they finally chose faculty, students, and
budget over Perich by hiring a permanent replacement teacher and
asking for Perich's resignation.53 This was perhaps not the best choice,
but it was understandable, probably not illegal,54 and in any event, not
evil. It left a trail of challenging facts for Hosanna-Tabor's lawyers to
deal with in litigation, but largely because the principal, the school
board, and the congregation reacted to the situation like normal people
series of misdiagnoses) (deposition testimony of principal).
48. See Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 884.
49. See, e.g., J. App., supra note 23, at *160-75 (e-mails from principal to Perich).
50. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553),
2011 WL 3919718, at *29.
51. See Laycock, Ministerial Exception, supra note 7, at 843.
52. Marie A. Failinger, Lutheran and Yet Not Lutheran: A Church School Tests the
Dilemma of Church and State, LXXV.3 THE CRESSET 19 (2012), available at http://works.b-
epress.com/marie failinger/8.
53. J. App., supra note 23, at *73 ("Q. [It was not the intent - the intent was not for
Ms. Perich to return the following school year? A. That is correct. Q. And what was the
reason... ? A. [Wle wanted to do a - a - have a replacement teacher... [slo we could
continue... with the operation of the school.") (deposition testimony of congregation presi-
dent); see Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 885 (Principal advising Perich when she
reported for work on February 22 that there was "no job for Perich to return to."); J. App.,
supra note 23, at *173-74 ("There will have to be some major preparations to be made to
provide for a smooth return. I'm sorry if I don't sound excited for you. I guess the
administrator in me is nervous about how to make the best of this situation for everyone.
Of course, rm concerned for you, but please remember that my main concern as the
principal is doing what's best for the ministry as a whole especially my students.") (e-mail
from principal to Perich).
54. Laycock, Ministerial Exception, supra note 7, at 843 (arguing that the school
accommodated Perich's hardship far beyond what the ADA required).
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making ill-advised promises and inconsistent choices under the pressure
of conflicting demands, rather than legal professionals trained to avoid
institutional liability.
In this story, Hosanna-Tabor is neither a church fighting to defend the
integrity of its doctrine nor a school whose leaders gave vent to a legally
prohibited prejudice, but a group of ordinary people dealing with the
messiness of real life.
B. Holdings
All of the stories end, of course, in the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) and Perich's bringing suit against Hosanna-Tabor
for unlawful retaliation under the ADA.5" The congregation argued
that the suit was constitutionally barred by the ministerial exception,
because Perich was a minister of the congregation and her employment
included ministerial duties.56 The federal district court dismissed the
suit under the exception," but was reversed by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which held that Perich was not a
minister for the purpose of the exception because her duties and
responsibilities were primarily secular.5" The Supreme Court subse-
quently granted certiorari review. 9
Based on its own factually constrained story, the Supreme Court
unanimously endorsed the ministerial exception, holding that if Perich
were a minister, the exception would absolutely immunize Hosanna-
Tabor from ADA liability.60 "Both Religion Clauses," declared Chief
Justice Roberts, "bar the government from interfering with the decision
of a religious group to fire one of its ministers."6' Noting historical
intrusions on religious liberty from royal appointments of ministers in
the English medieval and early modem eras,"2 the Court held that
55. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d 881.
56. Id. at 887.
57. Id. at 891-92.
58. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 781-82.
59. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783
(2011).
60. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4, 710.
61. Id. at 702.
62. Id. at 702-05. Commentators have strongly criticized the Court's blithe assumption
that abandoned, centuries-old practices of the established Church of England were relevant
to the existence or breadth of a constitutionally or common law ministerial exception in a
constitutional republic. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 7, at 11 (noting that England
abolished exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the 17th century, and that the United
States subjected clergy to secular court proceedings from the beginning); see also Winnifred
Fallers Sullivan, The Church, IMMANENT FRAME, available at http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/-
01/31/the-church/ ("The majority opinion in the unanimous decision from the Court in the
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state imposition of an "unwanted minister" on a church would violate a
"religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its
appointments," which the Free Exercise Clause protects.63 Relying on
the church property and office cases,' the Court further held that
government interference in ministerial appointments violates the
Establishment Clause, "which prohibits government involvement in such
ecclesiastical decisions.'5
The Court went on to find that Perich was indeed a minister, though
it declined to articulate a general definition and signaled its intention
to proceed case-by-case.66 The Court particularly noted that Perich
held the formal title of "minister," that the school and Perich each held
her out as and subjectively believed she was a minister, that she had
received formal ministerial education and training, and that her duties
"reflected a role in conveying the Church's message and carrying out its
mission."7 This placed Hosanna-Tabor's decision to terminate Perich
within the ministerial exception, and the Court accordingly reversed the
circuit court.66
III. GROUPS
A. Autonomy/ Oppression
Social groups both enhance and subvert the individual autonomy of
their members.69 On the one hand, groups are typically described as
Hosanna-Tabor case affirming the constitutional status of the ministerial exception as a
right of the church is supported by a curious mash-up of religious and political history ....
Profound differences in Roman Catholic, Reformation, and Anabaptist ecclesiologies and
understandings of the freedom of Christians are finessed in this breezy historical
account.").
63. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
64. Id. at 704-05 (discussing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976); Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679
(1871)).
65. Id. at 706.
66. Id. at 707.
67. Id. at 707-08.
68. Id. at 710.
69. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence ofReligious Group
Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99, 115-20 (1989) [hereinafter Gedicks, Group Rights]. The
group rights literature is small but overlaps the much larger ministerial exception
literature. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Organizational Freedom and Conditions on
Government Benefits, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 165 (2009); Brady, supra note 7; Perry
Dane, "Omalous"Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715 (2004); Ronald R. Garet, Communality
and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); Richard W. Garnett,
A Hands-OffApproach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We TalkingAbout?, 84 NoTRE DAME
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crucial to the creation and maintenance of personal meaning and
identity; most people define who they are by reference to groups to which
they belong or with which they identify.7" Groups also protect individu-
als from the contemporary liberal state, before which single individuals
are largely powerless.71 And finally, groups are an important source of
social values, which the liberal state is severely constrained from
developing and promoting itself.72
Yet, the very contributions of groups to individual autonomy-their
crucial roles in the formation of personal identity, protecting individuals
L. REV. 837 (2009); Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008) [hereinafter Garnett,
Do Churches Matter] ; Richard W. Garnett,Religion and Group Rights:Are Churches (Just)
Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT 515 (2007); Paul Horwitz, Churches
as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
79 (2009) [hereinafter Horwitz, Sovereignty and Spheres]; Mark DeWolfe Howe, The
Supreme Court, 1952 Term-Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 91 (1953); Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 7; Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise
Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L.
REV. 391 (1987); Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group
Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1773 (2004). See also Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
I began my academic career with enthusiasm for religious group rights, see Gedicks,
Group Rights, supra, but have since had second (and third) thoughts, see Frederick Mark
Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47
[hereinafter Gedicks, Recurring Paradox]; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Three Questions About
Hybrid Rights and Religious Groups, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PT. 192 (2008).
70. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICs 246 (1975) ("[Man makes
himself through the different forms of social life he establishes."); Cover, supra note 69, at
31 (Religious groups provide "a refuge not simply from persecution, but for associational
self-realization in nomian terms."); see also Brady, supra note 69, at 1677; Gedicks, Group
Rights, supra note 69, at 108, 116; Horwitz, Sovereignty and Spheres, supra note 69, at 41;
Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Community, and Lawyers' Ethics, 19 CAP. U.L. REV. 939,
940-41 (1990).
71. E.g., UNGER, supra note 70, at 282; Cover, supra note 69, at 49-50; Garnett, Do
Churches Matter?, supra note 69, at 294-95; Gedicks, Group Rights, supra note 69, at 115-
16; cf Pepper, supra note 70, at 944 ("If one has on the one side very large governmental
institutions and very large corporate entities and on the other side isolated individuals,
freedom for the individuals is not likely to mean a lot.").
72. Gedicks, Group Rights, supra note 69, at 116 ("In theory, at least, the goals of
liberal democratic government must depend on the moral values held by those that it gov-
erns--values that originate outside of government in churches, families, political parties,
trade unions, private schools, and other voluntary associations."); see also Bruce M.
Landesman, The Responsibilities of the Liberal State: Comprehensive v. Political Liberalism,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 171, 177 (2010) ("The development of liberalism arose with the idea
that equally reasonable people can have very different notions of a good life, and none can
claim obvious superiority over the others. Imposing one conception on everyone through the
power of the state is thus illegitimate.").
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from government excess, and supplying social values-may also subvert
it. The dependence of individuals on group norms and narratives for the
definition of who they are leaves them vulnerable to group coercion and
oppression." Individuals whose identity is psychologically embedded
in a group culture often feel pressure to behave in ways they otherwise
would not to avoid the existential crisis of expulsion.7 4 And while
groups buffer their members from oppressive government action, they
also buffer them from liberating government action: when government
intervention in group matters would enhance individual autonomy, as
in the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, group rights that block
such intervention subvert individual autonomy.75 Finally, groups are
important sources of social values, but group values are often not the
values endorsed by democratic majorities. 6
Hence the paradox of groups: They are simultaneously instruments of
individual liberty and individual oppression, in the precise measure that
they are insulated from government oversight and control.77
Religious groups present an especially intense instance of this
paradox. They usually supply complex explanations and thick narra-
tives of the meaning of human life, and in the name of "religious
freedom" claim special exemption from laws that bind everyone else.
Religious groups are thus an especially important source of the personal
identities of their believers who, in turn, are thus especially vulnerable
to pressure and oppression by the religious group to which they belong.
These connections to individual autonomy and vulnerability are
heightened when the member is employed by the group, which adds
economic dependence to the mix of vulnerabilities.7"
And make no mistake, churches do bad things.79 They can be racist,
73. See Gedicks, Group Rights, supra note 69, at 117; Underkuffler, supra note 69, at
1776; see also UNGER, supra note 70, at 266-67 ("By its very nature, community is always
on the verge of becoming oppression. The existing [group] consensus may be mistaken for
the final expression of the good, and used as a justification for denying the humanity of
individuals and rejecting the legitimacy of dissident groups.").
74. See, e.g., Robert A. Goldberg, The Challenge of Change: Social Movements as Non-
State Actors, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 65, 67-68 (2010).
75. See Lupu, supra note 69, at 431-32; Underkuffler, supra note 69, at 1783.
76. See Gedicks, Group Rights, supra note 69, at 117; Lupu, supra note 69, at 442.
77. Gedicks, Recurring Paradox, supra note 69, at 52.
78. Cf Lupu, supra note 69, at 435-36 ("[Ilt does not necessarily follow from norms of
associational freedom that organizations with autonomy over membership choices should
have comparable autonomy over employment choices. The inclination in our civil rights
law has for many years been towards giving a far wider berth of untrammeled choice to
authentic associational choices than to employment, residential, or educational choices.").
79. See Hamilton, supra note 7, at 1100 ("[R]eligious entities, like all other human
institutions, are capable of great harm to others, and the fact that their conduct is
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they can be sexist, they can be mean, bureaucratic, and vindictive.
Stereotypical thinking assumes that churches engage in bad behavior at
lower rates than secular groups, but recent history suggests otherwise.
Instances of clergy abuse and sex discrimination, for example, seem as
common in churches as in American society generally; certainly, they are
not uncommon in churches.80
B. Hosanna-Tabor
Although the Court had previously hinted at the notion that religious
groups might enjoy constitutional protection independent of that afforded
by the individual rights of their members, 1 Hosanna-Tabor is the
clearest endorsement of a doctrine of religious group rights in recent
memory. It repeatedly characterizes the congregation as an independent
constitutional rights-holder without any suggestion that those rights
derive from its members.
religiously motivated does not alter the fact of the harm."); Wendy Kaminer, Church, State,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 2011, available at
httpJ/www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/09/church-state-and-the-americans-with-
disabilities-act/245854 ("[Rleligious employers are merely human, and they don't always
act in good faith.").
80. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 7, at 1204-10 (describing clergy child abuse scandals
in the Catholic church and other religions).
81. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501, 507 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218
(1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); see also Corp. of the Presiding Bishop
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
82. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 702 (2012) ("Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the
decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers."); id. at 705 ("Until today, we have
not had occasion to consider whether this freedom of a religious organization to select its
ministers is implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in employment."); id. at 706 ("By
imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which
protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its
appointments."); id. (noting that "the text of the First Amendment ... gives special
solicitude to the rights of religious organizations" and rejecting "the remarkable view that
the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization's freedom to select
its own ministers"); id. at 709 ("By requiring the Church to accept a minister it did not
want, [a reinstatement] order would have plainly violated the Church's freedom under the
Religion Clauses to select its own ministers."); id. at 710 (emphasizing the importance of
"the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith,
and carry out their mission" and concluding that the "church must be free to choose those
who will guide it on its way"); see also id. at 713 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[Bloth the content
and credibility of a religion's message depend vitally on the character and conduct of its
teachers. A religion cannot depend on someone to be an effective advocate for its religious
vision if that person's conduct fails to live up to the religious precepts that he or she
espouses.").
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Hosanna-Tabor illustrates well the paradox of religious groups in
liberal society. The congregation and school represent the effort of a
group of believers to build a community where they could live out their
beliefs more fully, transmitting their values to the next generation by
educating their young within the community and providing opportunities
to believing teachers to participate in that ministry.83 There is little
doubt that this community informed the personal identity of its members
and employees and their understanding of the purpose and meaning of
life. There can also be little doubt that Hosanna-Tabor as a group
provided its members with a much more effective defense to government
intervention into their hiring decisions than any single member could
have raised on his or her own. The Court is correct that, as with many
religious groups, preserving the value of Hosanna-Tabor to its members
and to society depends on an unrestricted power to choose who will
personify and transmit its values."
But Hosanna-Tabor also illustrates the "dark side" of religious groups.
Not unlike secular employers who stereotype employee disabilities,
Hosanna-Tabor feared Perich's condition because it knew little about it,
and on that uninformed basis determined that they no longer wanted
her teaching at their school.' That Perich trusted the principal and
the school is obvious from her openness about her condition as her
treatment progressed to diagnosis and expected return-an openness
that was not reciprocated by the group, which used its own considerable
resources and leverage to give effect to their disability prejudice and
prevent Perich from returning to teach despite their previous promise to
hold her position while she recovered. 8 The buffering effect of the
congregation and school, their ability to protect their members from
83. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp.
2d 881, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (Hosanna-Tabor "provides a 'Christ-centered education' that
helps parents by 'reinforcing biblical principals [sic] and standards.' Hosanna-Tabor also
characterizes its staff members as Tne Christian role models who integrate their faith into
all subjects.'") (alteration in original) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor website); Opening Brief for
Petioner, supra note 13, at *4 ("Since its founding in the mid-1800s, the Synod has held
that the work of called teachers is sacred because, by teaching the faith in word and deed,
they perform part of the pastoral functions of the church."); id. at *7, *41 (describing
Perich's duties as an exemplar of "Christian faith and life" who was to transmit those
values to her students by means of the "close, personal relationship" with them developed
as their teacher, and to "live in Christian unity with the members of the congregation and
co-workers"); Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at *21, ("Schools like Hosanna-
TaborD exist to transmit the faith to children already in the church and to share the faith
with interested newcomers.").
84. See supra note 83.
85. See supra Part II.A.2.
86. Id.
420 [Vol. 64
2013] HOSANNA-TABOR 421
excesses of the liberal state, here are deployed to prevent Perich from
calling upon the democratically enacted protections of that same state
against the school's disability discrimination and retaliation, leaving
Hosanna-Tabor free to deal with Perich in a way that violated national
values codified in federal law.
IV. OBER-RIGHTS
A. Rights /Structure
Constitutional law distinguishes rights from structure. Constitutional
rights protect personal liberty interests against otherwise legitimate
government action, 7 and constitute duties owed by the government to
the individuals who hold them." Constitutional structure, on the other
hand, allocates sovereign power in the first place, granting or withhold-
ing such power from government, 9 for the benefit of society as a
whole.90
87. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3, 14 (1998); Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject
of Religion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1069, 1091 (1998); e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
941 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe First Amendment, which prohibits the
enactment of a category of laws that would otherwise be authorized by Article I .... ");
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) ("The proposition that a particular
instance of speech can be proscribable on the basis of one feature (e.g., obscenity) but not
on the basis of another (e.g., opposition to the city government) is commonplace and has
found application in many contexts."); Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson,
Antonin Scalia, and a Power theory of the First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 324, 325
(2000) ("Amendments III through VIII address boundaries between the federal government
and individuals that demand some kind of rule .... [They] are a kind of procedural
constraint-they do not restrain the government from acting at all in a particular area, but
restrain the way the government conducts its legitimate functions."); Carl H. Esbeck, The
Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOwA L. REV.
1, 8 (1998) ("For a rights clause to succeed in the task of securing personal religious liberty,
the political majority must be compelled to adjust its police power objectives to the needs
of the religious minority or religious nonconformist.").
88. See Bybee, supra note 87, at 324, 325; Esbeck, supra note 87, at 2-3.
89. ERNEST A. YOUNG, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 621-22
(2012); see 1 LAURENCE TRIBE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-3, at 125-26 (3rd ed.
2000); Esbeck, supra note 87, at 3; e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 453 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Commerce Clause is a structural provision allocating
authority between federal and state sovereignties.").
90. See Bybee, supra note 87, at 327 ("Once Congress is disabled from doing something,
it is immaterial who the intended beneficiaries of the clause were; the disability is absolute
and works to the benefit of everyone.").
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Because a constitutional right conditions or limits the exercise of
sovereign power that the government legitimately holds and would
otherwise be free to exercise, the individual who holds the right
generally may waive it,9 and the right may also be set aside when
larger demands of society so require.92 When the Constitution affirma-
tively denies sovereign power to the government, however, the govern-
ment is absolutely disabled from exercising the power so denied.
Structural limitations may not be waived because they are imposed for
the benefit of the whole society, not just those whose personal liberty
might be threatened in a particular instance.93 Nor does it matter that
the government has an important or even "compelling" reason for
exercising the power: There is no justification sufficient to invest in the
government sovereign power that the Constitution withholds from it. 4
91. Esbeck, supra note 87, at 3; Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid:
Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 123, 153 (2008); e.g.,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1986) ("[A]s a
personal right, Article III's guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication
is subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that dictate the
procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be tried."); Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) ("Because the requirement
of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such
rights, be waived."); Bybee, supra note 87, at 325 ("Amendments Ill through VIII are
personal privileges or immunities; they are rights in personam against the government,
and may be waived.").
92. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that state law school's
compelling interest in enrolling racially and ethnically diverse class outweighed white
applicant's equal protection right against racial classification).
93. Esbeck, supra note 87, at 3; Yuracko, supra note 91, at 153-54; e.g., Schor, 478 U.S.
at 850-51 ("Article III, § 1... serves as an inseparable element of the constitutional system
of checks and balances .... To the extent this structural principle is implicated in a given
case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason
that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction
beyond the limitations imposed by Article I1, § 2.") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702 (Subject-matter jurisdiction "functions
as a restriction on federal power .... Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant,
principles of estoppel do not apply, and a party does not waive the requirement by failing
to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings.") (citations omitted). See also Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Constitution
is a compact enduring for more than our time, and one Congress cannot yield up its own
powers, much less those of other Congresses to follow.").
94. E.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992) ("No matter how powerful
the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority
to require the States to regulate.").
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Government action taken in violation of structural limits is never
legitimate.95
From the founding era through the nineteenth century, the entire
First Amendment was thought to impose a structural disability on
federal government action." During the twentieth century, however,
most provisions of the First Amendment were reconceptualized as
individual rights that impose duties on government, probably under the
pressure of incorporating them against the states as due-process
"liberties."97 The Establishment Clause, however, continues to be
understood as a disability that immunizes the people from government
action that exceeds the limits of constitutional power.9" Thus, the Free
95. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Federal
Government may act only where the Constitution authorizes it to do so."); cf. Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 45, 55 (1913) (stating that a disability is literally a no-
power").
Numerous commentators have argued that structural constitutional restraints are
"Hohfeldian" disabilities. See, e.g., Bybee, supra note 87, at 318-2 1; Walter Wheeler Cook,
Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721, 726-27 (1919); Ronald R.
Garet, Three Concepts of Church Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1349, 1354-56, 1369-70
(2004); Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 7, at 122 & n.20, 135-
37; Gregory E. Maggs, Innovation in Constitutional Law: The Right to Education and the
Tricks of the Trade, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1048-49 (1992); Samuel C. Rickless, The Right
to Privacy Unveiled, 44 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 773, 775-77 (2007).
96. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1901) (dictum); accord id. at 297-98
(White, J., concurring) (First Amendment prohibitions are "absolute withdrawals of power
which the Constitution has made in favor of human liberty" which "are applicable to every
condition or status."); Thomas Jefferson, "Resolutions Adopted by the Kentucky General
Assembly," Res. III (Nov. 10, 1798), in 30 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1 JANUARY 1798
TO 31 JANUARY 1799, at 550, 550-51 (2003) (stating that the First Amendment confirms
that the Constitution afforded the federal government "no power over the freedoms of
religion, speech, or press . . ").
97. E.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 413 (Douglas, J., concurring) (Free Exercise Clause);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (Press Clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925) (Speech Clause); REX E. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 129
(1981) (Free Exercise Clause).
98. E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979) (affirming that civil courts are
barred from "resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and
practice," but allowing that civil courts may properly decide such disputes on the basis of
"neutral principles" of secular law such as "objective, well-established concepts of trust and
property law"); see Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 (1991) (Downes "suggested that the
constitutional prohibition against establishments of religion targets the competency of
Congress to enact legislation of that description-irrespective of time or place."); LEE, supra
note 97, at 129 (The Establishment Clause "has a different thrust" than the Free Exercise
Clause: "Unlike any other First Amendment provision, [it] deals with structural matters,
specifically the relationships between government and religious institutions or religious
movements."); Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 7, at 1795 ("[Ihe
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Exercise Clause now protects an individual right subject to waiver and
interest-balancing,99 whereas the Establishment Clause sets a govern-
ment limit that may not be transgressed regardless of whether a
powerful government interest might justify the transgression, 100 or
those affected by it might be thought to have waived their right to
object. 10'
Establishment Clause imposes jurisdictional limits on courts' authority to adjudicate issues
of religious import, and the Free Exercise Clause imposes limits on laws or doctrines that
single out religion for disfavored treatment.").
99. See LEE, supra note 97, at 129; e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (stating religiously burdensome laws that are not
religiously neutral or generally applicable must be narrowly tailored to protect a compelling
government interest).
100. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) (Establishment Clause
violations may not be balanced against majoritarian preferences); Colorado Christian Univ.
v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (Establishment Clause violations (other
than those involving religious discrimination) "flatly forbidden without reference to the
strength of governmental purposes."); Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations,
supra note 7, at 129 ("[A]n Establishment Clause-anchored doctrine of ministerial
exemption ... would admit of no interest-balancing whatsoever.").
101. See, e.g., Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a majority student vote to allow graduation prayer could not waive
constitutional limitations imposed by Establishment Clause), vacated as moot, 515 U.S.
1154, 1155 (1995); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. Am., 856 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1994)
(holding sua sponte that court lacked jurisdiction under Establishment Clause to adjudicate
theological questions despite failure of either party to raise issue), affd, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421, 433 n.32 (D. Conn. 1970) ("The
Establishment Clause is the guardian of the interests of society as a whole and is
particularly invested with the rights of minorities. It cannot be 'waived' by individuals or
institutions, any more than the unconstitutionality of state-prescribed school prayers could
be 'waived' by certain pupils absenting themselves from the classroom while they were
conducted."), affd mem., 403 U.S. 955 (1971); Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and
Congregations, supra note 7, at 135-36, 146 (The limitations imposed by the Establishment
Clause "cannot be waived or conferred by consent of the parties .... [Elven if all of the
parents in a public school district agreed to permit official prayers in the schools, the
practice would still violate the Establishment Clause ... ."); Laurence H. Tribe, The
Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma
of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REV. 330, 333 n.14 (1985) (The Establishment Clause "gives
rise to rights that are clearly not subject to waiver or alienation by any individu-
al--ertainly not by a recipient of government aid to religion, or by a citizen-taxpayer who
is the source of such aid. Thus it is plain that a church or church-related school could not,
for example, 'waive' the right to avoid intrusive governmental entanglement in order to
receive direct monetary aid from the public treasury."); Yuracko, supra note 91, at 153-54
("[Tihe Establishment Clause of the First Amendment ensures a government in which
church and state are separate. The goals and benefits of the Establishment Clause are
primarily social and structural, not individual. As such, individuals may not choose to
waive the protections of the Establishment Clause."). But see Fundamentalist Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Home, 698 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2012) (impliedly
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B. Hosanna-Tabor
1. Either/Or. The Court might have conceptualized the ministerial
exception as purely a right protected by the Free Exercise Clause, albeit
one held by a group rather than an individual. As a right, the exception
would generally allow religious groups freedom to choose their leaders
without government interference, but it would be lost if in a particular
circumstance the group acted in a manner inconsistent with an intention
to assert the right, or the government demonstrated an interest that
outweighed it.102 Thus, the Court might have addressed, for example,
whether the Synod's representation that church employees enjoy
protection against disability discrimination impliedly waived the school's
right to rely on the ministerial exception when such discrimination is
alleged.'3 One would also have expected some weighing of the
government's important interest in providing a remedy for disability
discrimination, against Hosanna-Tabor's interest in shaping the religious
character of its congregation and school by selecting its ministers free of
government interference, together with consideration whether the
government might have provided that remedy in a less intrusive
manner. The ministerial exception-as-right would have had potentially
broad application, but both waiver and balancing would have provided
some insurance against situations where the exception's application
would be unjust or undesirable.
The Court also might have conceptualized the ministerial exception as
a purely structural limitation imposed by the Establishment Clause. In
that event the potential waiver and balancing inquiries discussed above
would have been irrelevant, since structural limitations may not be set
aside by such considerations. Instead, the Court's focus would have been
on the bounds of the government's disability.' 4 The Establishment
holding laches a defense to Establishment Clause violation).
102. I am setting to one side the level of judicial scrutiny and other questions relating
to the precise balancing mechanism, although one would generally expect that some sort
of heightened scrutiny would be required to set aside the right in a ministerial exception
case.
103. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
104. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 7, at 122 ("[The
Constitution does not systematically protect the interests of certain classes of parties,
defined by religious mission; rather, the Constitution disables civil courts from resolving
certain classes of questions. This is an adjudicative disability."); id. at 148 (In deciding
whether it may resolve a dispute about ministerial appointment, "the court asks which
positions involve the kinds of assessments that courts should be forbidden to make."); cf.
JOHN FINNIS, NATuRAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 199 (2011) (Hohfeldian relations are
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Clause disability bars government from, among other things, resolving
disputed questions of religious doctrine and otherwise entangling itself
in religious matters. 15 The structural limitation on such entangle-
ment, however, does not prevent government from intervening in
religious disputes when it can do so on the basis of secular law without
deciding religious questions. The Court itself has held that a court may
resolve litigation involving disputed ownership of church property if it
can do so by recourse to neutral principles of secular law.06
At least two judicial inquiries might have resolved this case without
exceeding the limits of Establishment Clause structure: ordinary
principles of contract law, and pretext analysis under the ADA. The
detrimental-reliance inquiry is simple and secular: Did Hosanna-Tabor
promise Perich her job back after she recovered? Did she rely to her
detriment on that promise?' ' The answer to both questions seems to
be, "yes,"0 8 but in any event the inquiry would not have involved
interpreting Lutheran doctrine or resolving uncertainties about its
content or significance.0 9
The pretext inquiry is secular as well and, at least in this case, also
simple: If the school had reached a decision to terminate Perich before
she threatened suit in violation of Lutheran doctrine, that would be
powerful evidence that her doctrinal violation was not really the
issue."0 This inference would be confirmed by the school board's
actually "three-term[ed]," consisting of the two parties to the relation and some "act-
description signifying some act").
105. E.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (invalidat-
ing state court judgment that diocese did not follow its own doctrinal procedures in
dismissing bishop); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (holding state
court lacked power to decide theological questions in adjudicating church property dispute);
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (holding same regarding state
legislature). See generally Kent Greenawalt, Hands Offi Civil Court Involvement in
Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1843 (1998).
106. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 621 (1979) (holding that courts may properly decide
church property disputes on the basis of religiously neutral principles of secular law).
107. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); 1 E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.19 (3d ed. 2004).
108. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
109. See Griffin, supra note 7, at 37-38 (arguing that breach of contract claims may be
resolved by a "fairly direct inquiry" into whether the religious employer made and breached
an enforceable promise) (discussing Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United
Methodist Ch., 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
110. Cf. id. at 26 (A non-discriminatory justification that is put forward only after
discriminatory allegations is strong evidence that the non-discriminatory justification is
pretextual).
Professor Laycock, who represented the church in the Supreme Court, has suggested that
Perich threatened legal action before the school decided to fire her. See Laycock,
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unexplained rejection of the medical certification of Perich's ability to
return to work, in the absence of any expertise or evidence to the
contrary, as well as by the board's repeatedly expressed fears of having
a narcoleptic in the classroom."'
Alternatively, a court might also have found that disability discrimina-
tion or retaliation had nothing to do with Perich's termination, that it
was simply the result of legally unsophisticated administrators trying to
satisfy incompatible demands under the pressure of a difficult situa-
tion."2  Again, a court could have reached this judgment without
entangling itself in religious questions or doctrine.
2. Both/And. The Court might have conceptualized the ministerial
exception as either a group right or a structural limitation, both of which
contain definite (though different) restrictions on the scope of their
application. Like a good umpire, however, Chief Justice Roberts covered
both bases, holding that the ministerial exception is simultaneously free
exercise right and anti-establishment structure."'
Hosanna-Tabor makes clear that the ministerial exception is a free
exercise right, albeit one held by religious groups rather than individu-
als."4 Early on, the opinion reads two of its church property and office
cases as protecting a religious group autonomy right.1 ' It then
Ministerial Exception, supra note 7, at 844 ("When the principal called her that afternoon,
Perich announced that if she did not get her job back, she would sue the Church."). The
Supreme Court and the lower courts apparently read the evidence differently, as showing
that Perich threatened to sue in response to news that she was going to be fired. See
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700 (The principal "called Perich at home and told her that
she would likely be fired. Perich responded that she had spoken with an attorney and
intended to assert her legal rights."); Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774 (The principal "told
Perich that she would likely be fired, and Perich told [the principal] that she would assert
her legal rights against discrimination if they were unable to reach a compromise.");
Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 885 ("[The principal] indicated that Perich would likely
be fired and Perich indicated that she would assert her legal rights against discrimination
In any event, whether the decision to terminate Perich came before or after her threat
to take legal action is a question of secular fact that a court could have resolved without
religious entanglement.
111. See supra Part II.A.2.
112. See supra Part IL.A3.
113. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
114. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
115. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 ("[W~e declared the law [in Kedrofll unconstitu-
tional because it 'directly prohibit[ed] the free exercise of an ecclesiastical right, the
Church's choice of its hierarchy.'") (alteration in original) (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at
119); see also id. at 704 (Watson v. Jones "'radiates ... a spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation .. ."') (ellipses in
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straightforwardly holds that the Free Exercise Clause "protects a
religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its
appointments."116 It rejects the Speech Clause's freedom of association
as an insufficient foundation for the exception, because the First
Amendment "gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organiza-
tions." 117 Finally, it finds that the exception "operates as an affirma-
tive defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional
bar,""1 which is consistent with conceptualization of the exception as
a right that might be waived rather than a structural limitation that
may not. 119
But Hosanna-Tabor also makes clear that the exception is a structural
limitation under the Establishment Clause. The Court summarized
another of its property and office decisions as having held that the state
court's inquiry "into whether the Church had followed its own procedures
... had 'unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially
religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits
exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals' of the Church."120
Its structural Establishment Clause holding was as straightforward as
its group-rights Free Exercise Clause holding: "According the state the
power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also
violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government
involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions."12 1
original) (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116).
116. Id. at 706.
117. Id.; accord id at 713 (Alito, J., joined by Kagan, J., concurring).
Religious groups are the archetype of associations formed for expressive purposes,
and their fundamental rights surely include the freedom to choose who is qualified
to serve as a voice for their faith .... [A] religious body's right to self.governance
must include the ability to select, and to be selective about, those who will serve
as the very "embodiment of its message" and "its voice to the faithful."
Id. (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006)).
118. Id. at 709 n.4.
119. See Michael A. Helfand, Religion's Footnote Four: Church Autonomy asArbitration,
97 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that as an affirmative defense the
ministerial exception may be waived, and that this waivability enables a kind of
"constitutionalized arbitration" that would permit parties to a ministerial employment
dispute to agree to its resolution by a secular court); e.g., Hamilton v. Southland Christian
Sch., Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9865 (11th Cir. May 16, 2012) (holding that defendant
waived ministerial exception by failing to raise it in brief filed with court of appeals);
Petschonek v. Catholic Diocese of Memphis, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 330, at *17-18 (Tenn.
Ct. App. May 23, 2012) (holding that defendant's failure to raise ministerial exception at
trial prevented raising its consideration on appeal).
120. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 720).
121. Id. at 706.
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By conceptualizing the exception as both right and structure,
Hosanna-Tabor combined the absolute disability imposed by structure
with the broad applicability of group rights. The Court might have
moderated the expansive impact of this amalgamation by specifying a
narrow definition of "minister." Instead, the Court created a largely
functional definition based on whether the purported minister performs
any "important" religious duties.'22 Churches have already pushed
such functional definitions hard and far, to characterize as "ministers"
church employees well outside the prototypical congregational pastor or
parish priest," as indeed Hosanna-Tabor did before the Court.'
Since the responsibilities of many church employees, if not most, can be
linked to church doctrine or practice, one may expect that churches will
seek to apply the categorical immunity from government regulation
created by Hosanna-Tabor to most church employment decisions.
In short, Hosanna-Tabor's combination of a church autonomy right, a
structural limitation, and an indeterminate definition of minister created
a constitutional right on steroids: A broad, absolute, and categorical
church autonomy right to be free of government interference in most
122. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
123. Beyond traditional clergy, state and federal courts have characterized administra-
tive secretaries, choir directors, communications mangers, lay administrators, ministerial
administrators, music teachers, organists, school teachers, school principals, university
professors, organists, public relations personnel, administrators, and pastoral counselors
as "ministers" unprotected by federal or state unemployment statutes or state tort or
contract laws. See Corbin, Above the Law?, supra note 7, at 1976-77 & nn.61-66 (citing
cases); Griffin, supra note 7, at 3 & n.4 (same); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 290 & nn.8-13
(same). But see Brady, supra note 7, at 1695-96 (arguing that "the courts have not strayed
far from traditional clerical positions," and that "no federal court has included lay teachers
at religiously affiliated schools within the ministerial exception").
124. Opening Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at *39 ("Teaching religion, leading
worship, and leading prayer are religious duties regardless of who performs them."); Tr.
Oral Arg., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 4593593, at *15-16
("[I]f you teach the doctrines of the faith, if that is per your job responsibilities... we think
you're a minister .... [If] you teach an entire class on religion, we think you ought to be
within this rule.") (counsel to petitioner); id. at *55 ("A minister is a person who holds
ecclesiastical office in the church or who exercises important religious functions, most
obviously, including teaching of the faith."); see also Laycock, Ministerial Exception, supra
note 7, at 859-60.
Perich should clearly be within the ministerial exception, even though her position
is not what first comes to mind when one talks about ministers. She was not the
pastor of a congregation, or the assistant pastor. She did not spend full time, or
even a majority of her time, on the explicitly religious portions of her work. But
the religious work that she did was important: she taught the faith, she led
worship, and she represented the church to her students.
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employment decisions without a safety net of waiver or balancing even
when the decision is made on a prohibited secular ground.125
3. Reservations? The EEOC and Perich charged that construing
the ministerial exception to bar pretext inquiries in ministerial
employment actions "could protect religious organizations from liability
for retaliating against employees for reporting criminal misconduct or for
testifying before a grand jury or in a criminal trial."126  The Court
purported to reserve this and other similar questions,127 but it is
difficult to see how it could craft any such exceptions to the absolute
religious church autonomy right it has created.'28 At oral argument,
for example, Professor Laycock invoked the government's undoubted
compelling government interest in preventing child abuse, but neverthe-
less concluded that the law could not protect a ministerial employee fired
in retaliation for reporting to the authorities child abuse by the
church.
129
Consider, not so hypothetically, 3 ' that a religious school teacher like
Perich is terminated for cause after she reports having seen the pastor
of the sponsoring congregation sexually abusing a child at the school.
In response to her claim that her supposed deficiencies as teacher and
model of the faith were merely a retaliatory pretext, the church may
invoke the ministerial exception as a complete defense.
125. See Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, supra note 7, at 267 (variously
describing the ministerial exception as a "per se," "categorical," and "absolute" rule).
126. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
127. Id.
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a
minister, challenging her church's decision to fire her. Today we hold only that
the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the
exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach
of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.
Id.
128. See Corbin, Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 7, at 962-63 ("Ifa church has an absolute
right to select its ministers, it is not clear why the result would be different if it wished to
fire a whistle-blower minister....").
129. Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 124, at *5-6 (No. 10-553) (responding to a hypothetical
"about a teacher who reports sexual abuse to the government and is fired because of that
reporting[,J" Laycock stated, "[Tihe government can do many things to force reporting, to
penalize people who don't report, but a discharge claim by a minister presents the question
why she was discharged, and the court should stay out of that."); see also Reply Brief for
Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3919718, at *23-27
(detailing the options government would have to punish clerical child abuse, but listing no
such options for protecting reporting employees from retaliatory discharge).
130. Weishuhm v. Catholic Diocese, 787 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
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If the exception were a group right, the Court could coherently hold
that the group's interest in making ministerial employment decisions
free of government interference would be outweighed by the govern-
ment's obviously compelling interest in protecting children from the
horrors of sexual abuse, which would be supported by a rule that
protects reporting ministers from retaliatory termination. If the
exception were a structural limitation under the Establishment Clause,
the Court could coherently hold that a court may adjudicate whether the
termination is pretextual so long as it can do so without evaluating
religious doctrine. But since the exception is both, the Court can do
neither.
4. Exemptions? The Court has not recognized a general free
exercise right to exemption from religiously burdensome laws in more
than twenty years. In Employment Division v. Smith,'13 1 the Court
upheld state denial of unemployment benefits to two members of the
Native American Church who were discharged for violating state drug
laws after ingesting peyote as part of a sacred ritual. 2  The Court
held that religiously neutral and generally applicable laws are not
subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause,
even when they block or burden the free exercise of religion; 33 height-
ened scrutiny of a religiously burdensome law is called for only if the law
is not religiously neutral or generally applicable." The principal
justification offered for this rule was that it relieves judges of the need
to make judgments about the "centrality" of burdened religious practices
or to balance the extent of free-exercise intrusions against the impor-
tance of government interests. 135
Because the ADA is a neutral and general law, it should not trigger
a constitutionally compelled free-exercise exemption. Yet, a constitution-
ally compelled free-exercise exemption is precisely what the ministerial
exception is-how else can one conceptualize an "exception" to the
religiously neutral and generally applicable laws that would otherwise
131. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
132. Id. at 874-75, 882, 890.
133. Id. at 882-90; accord Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
134. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78; accord Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-33, 546. The Court
recognized two exceptions to this general rule which have not proved to be far-reaching or
otherwise significant. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 (heightened scrutiny may be called
for when the burden on religious practice is combined with burdens on other constitutional-
ly protected activity to create a "hybrid [right]"); id. at 884 (same regarding a system of
"individualized government assessment" that exempts secular activities but not religious
exercise from burdensome laws).
135. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-88.
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regulate ministerial employment?" 6  The Court gamely sought to
distinguish Smith as involving government burdens on "outward
physical acts," whereas Hosanna-Tabor concerned "government
interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and
mission of the church itself.""' The Native American believers in
Smith would no doubt have been interested to learn that their participa-
tion in the ritual that rested at the spiritual center of their personal
faith was a mere "outward physical act" that paled in comparison to a
Lutheran congregation's "internal faith and mission."
"Internal" church governance decisions might fall outside the ambit of
Smith if they are protected by the Establishment Clause, 138 which
disables government from, among other things, resolving religious
question for the church or otherwise interpreting religious doctrine.13
But if internal church governance decisions are also protected by the
136. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (holding that the Free Exercise Clause "protects
a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments").
137. Id. at 707.
Professor Laycock has argued that the better distinction is between external manifesta-
tions of religious practice and internal church governance, the latter of which, he
maintained, were never within the Smith rule. Laycock, Ministerial Exception, supra note
7, at 854, 854-56 ("Smith is about the government's general power of regulation; Smith is
not about the internal governance of churches .... [Tihe distinction is about 'outward
physical acts' versus 'internal' church decisions. The word outward is at least as important
as the word physical."); see Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 124, at *56 ("It's not that institutions
are different from individuals. It is that the institutional governance of the church is at
a prior step. Smith is about whether people can act on their religious teachings after they
are formulated. The selection of ministers is about the process by which those religious
teachings will be formulated.") (argument of Professor Laycock for Petitioner).
Laycock and some defenders of Hosanna-Tabor attach out-sized significance to a dictum
at the beginning of Smith which, they contend, reserved the line of cases purportedly
establishing a church autonomy doctrine that categorically immunizes from government
regulation of or intervention in disputes over religious doctrine and other matters of
"internal" governance, including ministerial appointments. See, e.g., Laycock, Ministerial
Exception, supra note 7, at 854 ("(The] government can not 'lend its power to one or the
other side in controversies over religious authority' [or dogma].") (quoting Smith, 494 U.S.
at 877); Lund, supra note 7, at 59 (same). In support of this dictum, Smith cited
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 445-52 (1969); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 95-119; and Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-25.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. However, Jones v. Wolf was decided in 1979, after all of these
decisions, and Jones expressly permits a court to decide such disputes-and thus by
definition to lend its power to one side or the other--so long as it does so on the basis of
neutral principles of secular law. 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979). Smith's approval of these
cases, therefore, can constitute a "reservation" or "preservation" of categorically protected
church autonomy rights only if one first begs the question whether that is what these cases
really stand for, and then further ignores the later effect of Jones.
138. Cf Lund, supra note 7, at 58-59.
139. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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140Free Exercise Clause, as indeed the Court insists, one cannot blink
the fact that Hosanna-Tabor has resurrected the constitutionally
compelled exemption doctrine interred by Smith," and has done so to
afford the faith more protection than the faithful. Church members still
possess no right to relief from incidental burdens that government
imposes on their religious practices,"" whereas religious groups are
now wholly exempt from the protections that federal and state employ-
ment laws afford an employee, so long as they can credibly assert that
an employee has "important" religious responsibilities or "represents the
faith."143
It is hard to justify this dramatically differential treatment within the
current doctrinal confines of the Free Exercise Clause, especially in a
country that has long prioritized individual over group rights.
When the pile up of this jurisprudential train wreck is cleared away,
three things remain: (i) constitutional endorsement of a broad zone of
categorical religious-group immunity from liability under federal and
state employment laws, a zone that conceptually prevents government
intervention, even to protect ministerial employees from retaliation for
reporting child abuse, sexual harassment, or other tortious or criminal
activity; (ii) resurrection of the constitutionally compelled exemption
regime that was abandoned precisely to avoid judicial determination of
the theological questions that inhere in the administration of such
regimes; and (iii) endorsement of a constitutional doctrine that affords
religious groups substantially more protection from government burdens
than it affords religious individuals.
The ministerial exception is so broad, absolute, and inflexible that it
can hardly be taken seriously.'" One suspects it may not be.145
140. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
141. See Kalscheur, supra note 7, at 47-48.
142. Cf. TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,66 (1977) (setting easily met threshold for Title
VII defense that accommodating religious practices of employee would create "undue
hardship").
143. See supra Part IV.B.2.
144. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 7, at 132
(arguing that "it seems staggeringly overbroad to characterize [the church property and
office] cases as insulating the 'internal affairs' of churches from the exercise of state
power [,]" because so-called internal affairs virtually always generate "negative externalities
that provoke legal interest"); see also Meredith Render, Religious Practice and Sex
Discrimination:An Uneasy Case for Tolerance, available at http://ssm.com/abstract-20191-
66 ("[In confirming that the ministerial exception is constitutionally required the Court
used strikingly broad language to describe the ambit of the Religio[n] Clause[]s protection
of religious organizations' ability to select their own ministers free from government 'inter-
ference.'").
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V. CONCLUSION: THIN RELIGION?
In its briefing and argument of Hosanna-Tabor before the Supreme
Court, Perich and the EEOC took the position that there was no
ministerial exception at all, arguing instead that the freedom of
association under the Speech Clause was sufficient to protect any
legitimate interests of religious groups in being excused from the general
constraints of anti-discrimination laws.4 6  No one on the Court took
this position seriously; as its opinion stated with undisguised incredulity,
under the freedom-of-association position
the First Amendment analysis should be the same, whether the
association in question is the Lutheran Church, a labor union, or a
social club. That result is hard to square with the text of the First
Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of
religious organizations. We cannot accept the remarkable view that
the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organiza-
tion's freedom to select its own ministers. 47
The tactical judgments of lawyers who lose 9-0 are fair game for
criticism, but Perich's and the EEOC's position is actually more
consistent with ongoing transformations of religious belief and practice
in the post-modern West than is the church autonomy Uber-right blessed
by the Court in Hosanna-Tabor. Over the last fifty years religious
diversity in the United States has grown dramatically and radically.
Changes in religious belief and practice (notably those associated with
the so-called "spirituality" movement) make church membership look like
joining a voluntary secular association-that is, something one does to
satisfy personal needs and social preferences, rather than one's response
to a claim on individual conscience by an entity which represents the
divine.148  Radical pluralism makes any exemption regime difficult to
145. Cf Esbeck, Autonomy, supra note 7, at 13 (warning that those who "embrace"
Hosanna-Tabor too "eagerly and then proceed to apply it where not intended" risk "a series
of lower court opinions seeming to cut back" on the decision, "with all the attendant
rhetoric about a 'clear and present danger' of religion unregulated and out of control").
146. Brief of Respondent Cheryl Perich, supra note 22, at *28-42; Brief for Federal
Respondent, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3319555, at *19-
32; Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 124, at *27-30, *37-38 (argument of Federal Respondent).
147. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (citation omitted).
148. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, God of Our Fathers, Gods for Ourselves:
Fundamentalism and Postmodern Belief, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 901, 907 (2010)
[hereinafter Gedicks, Postmodern BelieI (summarizing the various ways in which
contemporary religious belief has devolved from a search for transcendent and ultimate
truth to a self-centered consumer market activity designed to satisfy personal preferences).
See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: How RELIGION
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administer consistently and even-handedly no matter how hard one
tries,'49 while the devolution of traditional religion from an objective
representation of ultimate reality to a subjective "cafeteria choice"
suggests the already belated character of thick religious group identi-
ty.1
50
Hosanna-Tabor subverts individual autonomy to protect church
autonomy. 5' It affords greater free exercise protection to churches
than is enjoyed by their members.'52 It is so broad and absolute that
its doctrinal limitation seems inevitable,'53 yet its compound jurispru-
dential architecture is impervious to limitation.54 In the crowning
irony, the exception does all of this to safeguard an experience of
religious practice and belief that is rapidly passing away. It is fair to
wonder whether the ministerial exception will outlast the churches it
shields.
DIVDES US AND UNITES Us (2010).
149. See Gedicks, Postmodern Belief, supra note 148, at 909-10 (arguing that the
postmodern decline of religion as a distinct activity required elimination of the exemption
regime to avoid arbitrary line-drawing between religious exercise and comparable secular
moral activity).
150. Cf id. at 904, 913.
Postmodernity and the death of God are an insightful (if provocative) account of
our current condition in the West .... Our age is marked by radical dissensus
about the meaning of life, the reality of the world, and virtually everything else
that matters .... The possibility of a universally applicable and universally
accepted narrative that definitively explains the world and defines its truth and
reality is no longer a live one .... Neither the religion nor the secular philosophy
that makes cosmic claims about absolute and universally applicable truth can fit
in a world in which the notion of such a truth is no longer plausible to those who
do not already believe it.
Id.
151. See supra Part I.B.
152. See supra Part IV.B.4.
153. See supra Parts W.B.1 & IV.B.2.
154. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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